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In Coase’s Footsteps 
Douglas G. Baird∗ 
Abstract 
This paper revisits two examples of vertical integration in the early automobile industry: GM and 
Fisher Body on the one hand and Ford Motor and Keim Mills on the other. The paper shows that as-
set-specific investment and the fear of hold-up played at best a negligible role. What mattered in the 
case of GM and Fisher Body was close coordination of assembly operations. In the case of Ford Mo-
tor and Keim Mills, vertical integration was an important step (but only one of many) that Henry 
Ford took to ensure that his production team remained intact.  
In the case of GM and Fisher Body, GM’s decision to coordinate the assembly of Chevrolet 
components, including car bodies, at multiple locations proved crucial. Shipping complete car bod-
ies and storing them at each Chevrolet assembly plant was expensive and unwieldy. Instead, Fisher 
Body shipped sheets of stamped metal to assembly plants built at GM’s expense adjacent to each 
new Chevrolet assembly plant. At these plants, Fisher Body coordinated the welding of the sheets 
into car bodies with Chevrolet’s production team. The close coordination of these plant level opera-
tions made the activities of Fisher and Chevrolet indistinguishable from most activity that takes 
place inside a conventional firm. These production efficiencies made vertical integration sensible, 
but the date of formal legal integration came late and was not itself of great moment. 
The success of the Model T depended crucially on Henry Ford’s ability to keep his production 
team together. Many team members worked initially for Keim Mills, and Keim became a subsidiary 
of Ford. But, as in the case of GM and Fisher Body, the formal legal event marking vertical integra-
tion of Ford and Keim did not coincide with the important economic events. The members of the 
Keim Mills team designed the Model T well before vertical integration, and their later contributions 
came only when they moved from Buffalo to Detroit, something that was independent of and took 
place after vertical integration. The value of the Model T depended crucially on the members of the 
team Henry Ford put together, but relatively little on whether, as a legal matter, the Ford Motor 
Company employed them. 
 
 
 
Retracing famous journeys is a time-honored and worthy tradition. Great explorers necessar-
ily leave some terrain unsurveyed when they visit new territory for the first time. As we mark the 
Law School’s centennial, there is one journey especially worthy of our attention. When he was a 
20-year-old undergraduate, Ronald Coase spent the better part of a year visiting the great indus-
trial plants in the United States. Out of this research emerged The Nature of the Firm,1 The Prob-
lem of Social Cost,2 and much of modern law and economics. Coase solved many mysteries that 
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year, but, happily for the rest of us, not all of them. One of the most intriguing arises out of the 
relationship between General Motors and Fisher Body, one of its principal suppliers.  
Coase was primarily interested in what drove managers to produce something inside a firm 
rather than acquire it in the marketplace. GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body was therefore a subject 
of particular interest to him.3 Fisher Body began as an independent firm that supplied GM with all 
of its closed car bodies. In 1926, GM acquired Fisher and thereafter produced all of its car bodies 
internally, along with the two other major components of their cars (the chassis and drive train), 
both of which it made largely in house.4 Hence, while interviewing GM executives in 1932, 
Coase naturally asked about the firm’s acquisition of Fisher Body. They told him that the need to 
build body plants next to GM’s assembly plants drove the decision. The conversation, however, 
seems to have stopped here.5 Coase did not learn why they wanted body plants next to assembly 
plants or why doing this required the vertical integration of the two firms. As it happened, other 
bits of evidence led him to a new understanding of the nature of the firm, and this line of inquiry 
was left untouched.  
In this paper, I return to Coase’s brief conversations with these GM executives. I attempt to 
discover why they answered Coase’s question the way they did, and what they might have said 
had they been pressed further. My reasons are two-fold. First, economists in recent years have 
come to use the merger of GM and Fisher Body as the paradigmatic example of vertical integra-
tion.6 Reexamining what the managers thought they were doing has something to offer to this on-
going debate. Second, the inquiry itself casts some light on what gives firms value as going con-
cerns. Understanding going-concern value, the value that assets have if kept together inside an 
existing firm (and hence what will be lost if a firm is shut down), is central to my own work in the 
law of corporate reorganizations.7 Only to the extent that going-concern value exists can we jus-
tify a legal regime designed to preserve firms as going concerns. 
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I.   
By 1910, the automobile had taken the shape it was to have for many decades. It consisted of 
three principal components. First, there was the chassis, a rigid frame on which was attached the 
front wheels and steering mechanism. The second major component was the drive train. It con-
sisted of the engine, transmission, and a drive shaft connected by a differential gear to the rear 
wheels. The third component, the car body, was mounted on the chassis. In the early part of the 
century, the car body could be anything from an upholstered seat anchored on wooden floor-
boards to a closed body made of sheet metal. GM acquired different types of bodies from differ-
ent sources. Closed bodies, which Fisher supplied to GM, were the most substantial and the most 
expensive. Each body consisted of welded pieces of stamped sheet metal that enclosed the pas-
senger space and made the car suitable for travel in all seasons and weather.  
 In 1919, only about 10 percent of cars had closed bodies. By 1927, 85 percent had them.8 
Hence, over the course of a few years, Fisher became the supplier of a major component on the 
vast majority of cars that GM made. As closed bodies became more common, General Motor’s 
relationship with the Fisher brothers became closer. In 1919, GM acquired 60 percent of Fisher’s 
equity and entered into long-term contracts with the Fisher brothers, and established a voting trust 
giving each a voice in the affairs of the firm. In 1926, Fisher Body was dissolved and became 
folded into GM.9  
The increasing importance of closed bodies alone does not explain why GM acquired Fisher. 
In many industries, a manufacturer turns to a third party to produce an expensive component. The 
power plant of the modern jetliner accounts for a large part of its value, and aircraft makers rely 
on others for engines.10 Airbus acquires its components from many sources.11 GM, however, relied 
on Fisher to a greater extent than aircraft manufacturers rely on their suppliers. Aircraft manufac-
tures have multiple vendors of crucial parts such as engines and build relatively few planes 
slowly. Moreover, the most capital intensive components (such as engines) can be used in the air-
craft of more than one manufacturer. By contrast, GM relied on Fisher exclusively for a continu-
ous flow of goods, and the parts Fisher made for GM could not be sold to anyone else. In short, as 
long as Fisher remained independent, each was exposing itself to a risk of hold-up by the other. If 
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Fisher closed or merely threatened to close its doors, GM would be forced to close its production 
lines down as well, at least for a time. Similarly, GM could threaten to seek other vendors once 
Fisher invested in dies and other machinery that could be used only for GM cars. The ability of 
each to hold the other hostage seems to make vertical integration desirable once car bodies be-
came so important to its operations.12 
Coase quickly saw that this explanation could not withstand close scrutiny. GM as well as 
other firms in the automobile industry routinely relied on outside vendors for critical parts. One 
could not assert that a hold-up potential led to GM’s acquisition of Fisher unless one explained 
why it did not create the same problem for the other critical vendors as well. The unsoundness of 
the hold-up explanation became manifest to Coase when he visited A.O. Smith. It had one of the 
most heavily automated plants in the United States. Filled with expensive and highly specialized 
machinery, A.O. Smith supplied GM with car frames. If GM could solve the potential hold-up 
problems that A.O. Smith presented without bringing it inside the firm, GM should have been 
able to solve them with Fisher.13 Moreover, Coase found that ways of solving the hold-up problem 
existed apart from vertical integration.14 GM, for example, could retain ownership of the dies that 
Fisher used to stamp sheet metal. Fisher did not have to make a capital investment only to have 
GM turn to another supplier, and GM’s ownership of the dies would allow it to retrieve them in 
the event that Fisher try to take advantage of it. Rejecting hold-up as the explanation for vertical 
integration, Coase had to look elsewhere. 
The explanation that Coase ultimately developed for vertical integration began with the idea 
that transaction costs, rather than advantage-taking or private information, drove the organization 
of production. To present his argument in The Nature of the Firm, however, he did not draw on 
the example of GM and Fisher. Nor did Coase unpack the explanation that GM executives of-
fered—that they wanted Fisher body plants to be next to GM assembly plants. In other words, he 
did not squarely confront the question of what made Fisher different from A.O. Smith. Why did 
the executives at GM acquire Fisher and build its own car bodies, but never acquired A.O. Smith 
or build its own automobile frames? This is the question that Coase did not pursue and that I re-
visit here. The answer begins with the strategy GM’s leader, Alfred Sloan, put in place when he 
took the helm of GM in the early 1920s. 
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Sloan was convinced that crucial to GM’s success was expanding the market share of Chev-
rolet, its lowest priced car.15 Ford held over half the domestic automobile market and, among low-
price cars, dominated both the Chevrolet and all other rivals. No one could compete with the 
Model Ts in either durability or in price. Sloan believed that competing effectively against the 
Model T was crucial to GM’s long-term success. GM developed a new Chevrolet, the K Model. It 
featured a longer body, increased legroom, an improved clutch, and a superior rear-axle housing.16 
The K Model met with only modest success initially. The price gap between it and the Model T 
was still too large. The Model T continued to enjoy 70 percent of the low-priced car market. To be 
successful, GM had to find a way both to improve the quality of the K Model and produce it more 
cheaply.17  
Central to bringing this about was replacing the person in charge of production in the Chev-
rolet division with “the best production man in the United States,”18 a man named William Knud-
sen. Knudsen was empowered to make dramatic changes at Chevrolet, and he did exactly this. 
Knudsen divided the production of automobiles into two largely separate operations. First there 
was the manufacturing of the basic components, such as the engine, the transmission, the wheels, 
and so forth. Second, there was the question of assembling the component parts. Knudsen was 
convinced that efficient production required a dramatically different approach to each.19  
Knudsen insisted that each individual component, such as engines and transmissions, be 
manufactured in only one location. Motors were to be made in Flint. So too the axles had to be 
made in one place (Detroit); the transmissions as well (Toledo). Chevrolet had long used outside 
vendors and acquired parts from other divisions of GM (including radiators, steering wheels, and 
ball bearings). Knudsen did not object to continuing relationships with outside vendors, provided 
that they redesign components along the lines he demanded.20 The car had performance criteria 
that it needed to meet. In particular, it had to outperform the Model T. Hence, the parts had to be 
at least as good as those on the Model T. One could not use cheap steel merely because it was 
cheap, especially not where the Model T used vanadium steel alloys.  
Knudsen was content, at least initially, to leave Fisher’s manufacturing operations un-
touched. The principal change Knudsen brought about in GM’s relationship with Fisher grew out 
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of his approach to assembly of automobile components, not the manufacture of individual com-
ponents.21 Automobile components are easy to ship in bulk, while finished cars are not. Moreover, 
while economies of scale exist in manufacturing automobile components such as engines and 
frames, there are relatively fewer in assembling cars, once a model is produced in sufficient vol-
ume and the method for assembling the car has been refined and documented. Assembly plants 
consist of large open factory floors with conveyers and pulleys that bring the pieces to the correct 
place. They were not expensive to build or replicate.22 Moreover, as long as the delivery of com-
ponents was properly coordinated, the assembly of the cars required little in the way of skilled 
labor. The basic philosophy of mass production is the manufacture of component parts to high 
tolerances. If this was done properly, the assembly of the car itself required no special expertise.23 
Assembly of automobiles did not depend upon expert fitters who assembled the parts to shape 
them so that they worked together. “In mass production, there are no fitters.”24 The costs associ-
ated with building assembly plants and the costs of hiring and supervising the largely unskilled 
workforce were lower than the cost of transporting finished cars across long distances.  
Capturing these savings at Chevrolet, however, required Knudsen to change GM’s relation-
ship with Fisher. Fisher could continue to stamp the different pieces of sheet metal at its own fac-
tories. These stamped parts, like other auto components, could be shipped at low cost. But assem-
bling the pieces into the automobile body was a different matter. Like a finished car, a completed 
car body is expensive to ship and more subject to dents and other damage en route. Moreover, 
storing an inventory of assembled car bodies was a nontrivial problem. Stamped pieces of sheet 
metal can be stacked; welded car bodies cannot be. Every eyewitness to these assembly plants 
marveled not at the physical plant itself, but rather the level of organization needed to ensure the 
steady flow of more than a million pounds of material each day that kept the assembly line in op-
eration.25 
Knudsen insisted that Fisher adopt the same practices for assembling car bodies as he insti-
tuted for the different components of the chassis and drive train. Fisher could stamp the sheet 
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metal anywhere, but the bodies themselves had to be welded together at a factory adjacent to the 
auto assembly plant. The two plants were to be connected with a system of dollies and conveyers. 
The cost of making this change was modest. The cost of shifting the location in Fisher’s car body 
assembly plants required a capital investment of about $5 million.26 This is a trivial sum com-
pared with Chevrolet’s annual operating expenses of half a billion dollars.27 Body assembly 
plants, like auto assembly plants, require little more than open factory space and a conveyor sys-
tem. There is almost no asset specialization.28 Moreover, it was easy enough for GM to pay for 
building the facility and then lease the space to Fisher.29 In short, with Knudsen’s arrival at Chev-
rolet what changed was not asset-specific investment by Fisher in Chevrolet, but rather the way 
Fisher conducted its day-to-day operations. 
Knudsen brought to Chevrolet a production strategy that resulted in a world in which a large 
part of Fisher’s operations were physically joined with Chevrolet’s. Controls had to be put in 
place to ensure that each day the proper number of engines, transmissions, and frames were de-
livered to the assembly plant. At the same time, a corresponding assortment of stamped sheet 
metal (as dictated by Knudsen) had to arrive at the adjacent Fisher assembly plant. At the same 
time the components for the chassis and the drive train were brought together at the Chevrolet 
plant, the pieces of sheet model forming the body of the relevant model had to be rolled on a 
dolly from the Fisher plant and deposited at the appointed place in the Chevrolet assembly line. 
Completely central to Knudsen’s view of production was the idea of central planning and 
engineering. The center directed each of the managers as to how many cars to make each month 
and ensured that the necessary components were shipped. Changes or alterations were cleared 
through the center. One central authority decided how many of which model would be made at 
each Fisher/Chevrolet assembly location each month. At each location, Fisher and Chevrolet had 
to coordinate minute-by-minute operations. A stranger visiting any site would likely not see any 
separation between Fisher’s operations and Chevrolet’s. In short, Knudsen’s decisions about how 
to produce the Chevrolet required seamlessly integrating Fisher’s body assembly operation with 
its own auto assembly operation. 
Knudsen’s scheme did not require the creation of a single entity as a legal matter. It is possi-
ble to imagine that Fisher and GM could have continued to coordinate through contract even if 
the acquisition had not taken place. In the 19th Century, for example, it was common for factory 
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owners to hire independent jobbers who supplied the labor force.30 An assembly line with two 
separate owners is like a railroad between two cities with half the track being owned by one firm 
and half by another. Such things have precedent. (The Central Pacific and the Union Pacific being 
the most obvious example.31) All the issues of coordination can (and indeed for some period of 
time were) solved through contract. Nevertheless, one suspects that once the two operations be-
came so closely integrated, GM’s complete acquisition of Fisher was the logical next step.32  
From the perspective of an economist interested in how goods are produced and the extent to 
which operations take place in the market or through command and control inside the firm, the 
integration of Fisher and Chevrolet took place before acquisition. GM’s acquisition of Fisher 
Body in 1926 was not the main event. Indeed, the acquisition may have had almost no effect on 
the way in which Chevrolet interacted with Fisher at the plant level. Many of the decisions, such 
as the way in which the managers of any two assembly operations coordinated their work, was 
unaffected.  
II.   
We can return then to the puzzle that Coase left unanswered: How was Fisher different from 
A.O. Smith? The answer is straightforward: Completed car bodies (which Fisher supplied) were 
expensive to ship and hard to store, but automobile frames (which A.O. Smith supplied) can be 
shipped and stored easily. Efficient manufacture requires coordination of the assembly of the 
body with the rest of the car. The assembly of the frame requires no such coordination. The rea-
sons for bringing Fisher within GM’s orbit had nothing to do with asset-specificity and every-
thing to do with minimizing production costs. Even when one retraces old journeys many decades 
later the basic landscape does not change.  
GM, and more specifically Chevrolet, reorganized its production in the 1920s with a view to 
capturing the same efficiencies as Ford. Doing this required a dramatic increase in the level of 
cooperation between GM and Fisher, to the extent of building factories next to one another and 
ensuring production in each were seamlessly coordinated. Indeed, relocating Fisher’s assembly 
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operation made Fisher more integrated with Chevrolet than suppliers inside GM itself, even be-
fore the merger in 1926. Chevrolet’s source of radiators provides a good illustration. 
In 1925, Chevrolet used radiators from Harrison, a wholly-owned division of GM. As a mat-
ter of legal form, interactions with Harrison were inside a single legal entity, while those with 
Fisher were not. Chevrolet could have acquired its radiators as easily from a third-party vendor as 
from Harrison. Moreover, it could readily switch from Harrison to another source of supply at 
little cost or acquire its radiators from multiple sources. Nothing in the way Chevrolet organized 
its production required close cooperation from Harrison. Neither Knudsen nor anyone else at 
Chevrolet had the control over Harrison’s operations that remotely resembled the control they had 
over Fisher’s. The control rights Chevrolet acquired by both contract and its long-term relation-
ship made Fisher’s assembly operations much more a part of the Chevrolet “firm” than Harrison 
ever was even before vertical integration occurred.  
III.   
The distinction between an activity in a firm and activity outside one is a useful one. But 
drawing a line between the two is often hard. Moreover, drawing this line by identifying the dif-
ferent legal entities engaged in a particular economic activity is often misleading. Vertical integra-
tion may bring no change at all in the way two entities interact with each other. The firm-market 
boundary can be unaffected. The question of how economic activity is organized is separate from 
the question of which legal entities own which assets. Vertical integration in the case of GM and 
Fisher had only a modest effect on the way in which Fisher actually built its car bodies. Another 
merger in the early history of the Ford Motor Company points to the same conclusion.  
In 1903, Henry Ford was a failure. He formed the Detroit Motor Company in 1901 and ran it 
into the ground. He then founded the Henry Ford Company and was thrown out when he proved 
incapable of bringing his car designs into production. He started the Ford Motor Company, his 
third company, on a shoestring. He had little money of his own and, given his track record, little 
ability to raise it from anyone else. He started with only $28,00033 and had only $223 left before 
selling his first car.34 Nevertheless, by 1909 Ford was rich and poised to become rich beyond 
dreams of avarice.35 What did Ford do between 1903 and 1909 and to acquire so much wealth? 
And, crucial for our purposes, how much of this value was embedded in the Ford Motor Com-
pany?  
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Henry Ford had three qualities that separated him from the hundreds of others who formed 
car companies at the start of the 20th Century. First, Ford was a great designer of cars. In the first 
years of the century, no one else designed cars so well. Whatever other failings he had (and there 
were many) no one doubted his ability to design cars. The car he designed at the Henry Ford 
Company (his second company) was among the best of its time. The car the company ultimately 
produced (renamed Cadillac) was successful in large measure because Ford was its designer.36 
But Ford’s greatest car design was the Model T. Before the Model T, cars were still wagons 
with engines attached. The Model T consisted of a single rigid metal frame, to which the drive 
train was affixed in only three places. The car was at once light, flexible, and durable. Ford used 
exotic alloys to reduce the weight of the car further still. The engine, transmission, and magneto 
were enclosed within a single housing that protected them from the elements. Every part of the 
car was designed to be assembled, and operated, and maintained easily.37 Many cars of the time 
were much more expensive, but, putting “extras” such as lavish appointments to one side, it was 
the finest car ever made.38 It was the first modern automobile, a durable, efficient machine that 
took people on rugged dirt roads wherever they wanted to go.  
Ford’s second extraordinary quality was his willingness to bet big. Before the Model T, the 
Ford Motor Company’s cars had been successful and had made Ford a millionaire. At the start, 
the company farmed out all of its manufacturing operations. Ford oversaw a small assembly op-
eration. He spent $384 on parts for each car, but only $20 on the labor needed to assemble each 
car39), and he could have comfortably remained on that course. Instead, he took all the money he 
had made to date and risked everything on the Model T. He gambled that he could take this car, 
produce it for much less than anyone thought possible, and persuade millions to buy it. At a time 
when most thought cars were merely playthings for the rich, Ford believed that a car could be 
built that was so useful that ordinary people would give up the greater part of a year’s salary to 
own one. 
The Model T was a huge success, and the patent protection Ford won for some crucial ele-
ments of Model T design made it hard for others to follow his lead.40 Hence, Ford had several 
years to enjoy the benefit of designing the Model T and betting that it would find commercial ac-
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40
 There were eight patents covering the Model T. The most important was the U.S. Patent No 1,012,620, which covered the 
way in which the drive train was connected to the chassis. For a discussion, see Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops 
at 20–21 (cited in note 23). 
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ceptance. But Ford’s willingness to bet big and his design do not explain how Ford came to 
dominate the automobile industry between 1912 and 1925. The Model T was a revolutionary car 
in 1908, but it was essentially unchanged in 1912. Nothing prevented others from producing a car 
much like the Model T. The patents did not foreclose other low-cost designs. Nor did Ford pos-
sess any secret manufacturing techniques. Ford allowed anyone to visit his plant and see exactly 
how he produced the car.41 Anyone who wanted to could design a car like the Model T and copy 
Ford’s production methods. Nor did manufacture of such a car require investments of capital that 
were out of reach of the many others in the industry in 1913. Indeed, at this point, Ford’s entire 
capital investment in his physical plant and equipment was less than $10 million, at a time when 
his annual operating expenses were $74 million and his revenues were more than $89 million.42 
What prevented others from competing with Ford after they saw the Model T and the suc-
cess it enjoyed? Why did it take 15 years before someone like Knudsen came along to reorganize 
the production of the K Model Chevrolet and produce a competitive alternative to the Model T? 
Ford’s gifts as a designer and his willingness to gamble do not explain this part of the story. Ford 
enlisted others to help him in designing the Model T. One of the revolutionary features of the 
Model T (encasing the drive train) was not his or his employees’, but rather a team of engineers at 
a sheet metal stamping firm in Buffalo called Keim Mills.43 Ford himself had little expertise in 
sheet metal stamping. Moreover, at this period, the presses used to stamp sheet metal and the dies 
needed to fabricate any given part were hard to replicate. Ford had greater reason to ensure that 
he had control over the assets dedicated to the production of the Model T than those at Chevrolet 
15 years later. 
But the value Ford derived from Keim Mills stemmed only in small part on the specialized 
assets. More important was the help he enjoyed from the engineers who worked there. Ford’s 
success between 1909 and 1925 came from the team of engineers who surrounded him. They de-
vised thousands of ways to produce the Model T more efficiently, more cheaply, and in greater 
volume. Most of the production innovations Ford’s team put in place came from organizing the 
flow of production. The Ford team took each step and each part and figured out how to rearrange 
                                                     
41
 See Ford Factory Facts 5 (Ford 1915) (“The Ford Motor Company is pleased to extend to all visitors the privilege of an in-
spection of its plant.”). The American Machinist carried a series of articles on Ford’s manufacturing techniques in 1913. See, for ex-
ample, Colvin, Building an Automobile Every 40 Seconds at 757 (cited in note 23) . Another series that appeared in the Engineering 
Magazine in 1915 was later published as a book. See Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops (cited in note 23).  
42
 See id at 25 ($3.575 million on buildings, tanks, and fixtures through February 1914 and $2.8 million on equipment); id at 13 
(revenues of $89.1 million in 1913); id at 1 (profits of $15 million per year). 
43
 See Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 94–95 (cited in note 18) (describing the stamping process and the Keim mills). 
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the work and redesign the component to make it better and cheaper.44 The moving assembly line 
(put in place in 1913, fully five years after the Model T entered production45) was the most strik-
ing innovation, but it was only one of many. 
Ford became rich in large part because his team worked unusually well together, and they 
created efficiencies in mass production that had never been seen before, both by refining old pro-
duction techniques and putting in place new ones. Ford’s design gifts, his vision, and his patents 
gave him a head start over potential rivals. The team ensured that he kept his lead. Month by 
month they found small improvements in the car and especially its method of manufacture.  
Imagine an entrepreneur who set out to build a car comparable to Ford’s Model T. With a 
modest amount of capital and good design skills and a competent production team, he could re-
verse engineer the car, design around the patents, and imitate Ford’s production practices. Within 
six months or a year’s time, he might bring to market a car that was as good as the one Ford pro-
duced the year before. But it would be too late. He would discover that he was competing against 
a slightly better Model T the price of which had fallen by 10 percent. To be more precise, the 
Model T (Touring) had a factory price of $600 in 1913, $550 in 1914, $490 in 1915, $440 in 
1916, and $360 in 1917.46 The Ford Motor Company, as a collection of physical assets, was not 
worth much. As long as Ford had his engineering drawings, the necessary gauges, his patents, and 
his team, little else mattered. His factory could burn to the ground, all but a handful of employee 
could quit, and the value of what Ford owned would be remarkably unaffected.  
The Ford Motor Company owned the Model T design and the information needed to build it. 
But the corporation did not own the team. Indeed, among the most important members of the 
team worked for Keim Mills and not for Ford at all.47 For a period of time, the contracts and rela-
tionship between Ford Motor and Keim Mills, and between Keim Mills and its engineers were 
satisfactory. Ultimately, Ford acquired Keim Mills and it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Ford. But the major event (and the one that had the greatest consequences for the long-term suc-
cess of Ford) came after Ford acquired Keim Mills.  
The unskilled workers who ran the stamping presses at Keim Mills thought that they had the 
ability to hold-up Ford. They were sadly mistaken. When they went on strike, Ford promptly shut 
the entire firm down. Just as a contract could have been written that vested title in the stamping 
                                                     
44
 The idea that the Model T never changed is an illusion. A practiced eye can tell the date of manufacture of any particular 
Model T within a few years at a glance. With only a little more study, one can narrow it down to a few months. See Bruce W. 
McCalley, Model T Ford: The Car that Changed the World 11 (Krause 1994). 
45
 See id at 11 (first Model Ts manufactured in 1908); Rubenstein, Making and Selling Cars at 23 (cited in note 22) (describing 
the first moving production line in 1913). 
46
 See McCalley, Model T Ford: The Car that Changed the World at 141, 171, 193, 195, 231 (cited in note 44). 
47
 See Hounshell, American System at 234 (cited in note 17) (describing the Keim team). 
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presses in Ford, Keim’s status as a wholly-owned subsidiary gave him the same power. Ford im-
mediately dissolved Keim Mills and moved all the stamping presses to Detroit. More importantly, 
he was able to persuade the senior team at Keim Mills to move to Detroit as well. Here what mat-
tered was not whether Keim Mills was independent or wholly-owned, but whether Henry Ford’s 
powers of persuasion were sufficient to keep his team together. The value of an enterprise resides 
in large measure in the team that runs it.48 The most important contributions of the Keim Mills 
team came from their skill in organizing automobile production, not from their expertise with re-
spect to stamping metal parts or any other specialized skill. It was, for example, one of them that 
created the incentive compensation system that allowed Henry Ford to boast that he paid his 
workers $5 a day.49  
The value of a team, however, is independent of the legal entity that employs them. Ford be-
came rich because he was able to assemble a great team and keep it together. It is not surprising 
that ultimately the team became Ford employees, just as it is not surprising that GM ultimately 
acquired Fisher. But again the formal legal event did not coincide with the events that mattered. 
The members of the Keim Mills team designed the Model T well before vertical integration, and 
their later contributions came only when they moved from Buffalo to Detroit, an event that took 
place after vertical integration and that did not depend on it. 
IV.   
The production of the Model T Ford and the K Model Chevrolet are two important events in 
the early history of the automobile industry. They were both great success stories in which Keim 
Mills and Fisher Body played crucial roles. They also present two instances in which an upstream 
supplier ultimately became a wholly-owned subsidiary of its principal buyer. In the case of GM, 
efficient production required command and control over a large part of Fisher Body’s operations. 
The assembly of car bodies from individual pieces of sheet metal requires little in the way of spe-
cialized assets or capital, but the control the automobile assembler has over the operation in mass 
production ensures that the two operations are part of the same firm in the economic sense. In the 
case of Ford, vertical integration is one part of a story connected with acquisition of human capi-
tal. Vertical integration helped Ford keep the Keim Mills team, but the team existed before verti-
cal integration, and its full value came after vertical integration only when the team moved to De-
                                                     
48
 For an account of this episode, see Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 106 (cited in note 18). It may be no accident 
that Ford Motor lost its primacy as the Keim Mills team deserted Henry Ford. Its members included William Knudsen, the production 
man Ford himself thought the best in the business. See note 18. 
49
 Faced with extraordinary employee turnover, one of the Keim Mills team (John Lee) instituted a new wage structure. He 
maintained a base pay of $2.34, but a worker could earn $5 a day if they worked for 6 months and qualified in other respects. See 
Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 117–18 (cited in note 18) (describing Ford’s employee pay rates).  
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troit. That vertical integration as a legal matter occurred in each case is unsurprising, but logically 
distinct from the events that brought assets inside the “firm” in the economic sense.  
The formal event that marks vertical integration as a legal matter corresponds only imper-
fectly with whether activity takes place inside or outside the firm. As costs of doing business in 
the market and in the firm fall, however, we should expect the stakes involved in locating produc-
tion inside or outside a firm should fall as well. As we retrace Coase and then ask about the impli-
cations of his work in the issues we confront today, we might well conclude that the boundary 
between firms and markets will become increasingly permeable. For economists, the lesson is 
straightforward. They should resist, to a much greater extent than they have, the temptation to 
turn to the law to identify the firm.  
For lawyers, the lesson is more subtle and the challenge harder. As we regulate economic ac-
tivity, we must resist the idea that the locus of economic activity rests with a discrete legal entity. 
A lawmaker charged with ensuring that those who assembled Chevrolets complied with applica-
ble law had to ensure that the rules worked equally well when the same configuration of assets 
was run by two legal entities as by one. Thinking about legal regulation of economic activity has 
too readily assumed that one can solve problems by imposing legal duties on firms. In a world in 
which the boundaries of the firm become less clear and the identity of those who control the firm 
becomes more fluid, regulations that focus on the conduct of specific firms is at best incomplete 
and often misguided. We are likely to encounter even greater problems in regulating behavior. No 
longer are the entities providing the goods or services long-lived, atomistic firms with a readily 
identifiable governance structure. When we want to use legal rules to advance some broader so-
cial goal inconsistent with the interests of those who own the enterprise, we shall be increasingly 
less able to do it by imposing obligations and duties on firms and those who invest in them. To 
the extent that it is still possible in a global economy, effective legal rules will increasingly focus 
on regulating economic activity, rather than on regulating distinct legal entities. 
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